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ABSTRACT
There has been a historical availability of new trials based on newly discovered
evidence in the United States. At present, the standards for granting relief based
upon newly discovered evidence typically involve some combination of showings
that (1) the new evidence could not have been discovered prior to trial; (2) the
petitioner has exercised reasonable diligence in raising the new evidence; (3) the
new evidence is relevant and beyond mere impeachment; and (4) the new evi-
dence has verdict changing capacity. In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences
officially criticized the accuracy of many forensic identification methods. Subse-
quently, petitioners have argued this criticism is newly discovered evidence. Ap-
pellate courts, however, routinely reject such claims. In doing so, the courts show
fidelity to procedural fairness, finality and predictability, and consequently side-
line competing ideals of substantive accuracy. By signalling that procedural reg-
ularity legitimizes decisions, the courts are applying classic tenets of legal process
theory. This paper critically explores the institutional competence of appellate
courts to address the legal questions that flow from the scientific uncertainty doc-
umented by the Academy. It concludes that courts are neither giving sufficient
deference to shifting scientific opinion nor fully acknowledging their own consti-
tutional position for addressing scientific uncertainty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Herrera v. Collins1 the United States Supreme Court noted that although
the United States Constitution was silent on the subject of new trials, there had
been a “historical availability of new trials based on newly discovered evidence
in the United States.”2 This availability can be traced back to 17th Century Eng-
land3 and up to the current Era of Innocence in America. Now, the precise stand-
ards for granting relief based upon newly discovered evidence varies from state-
to-state (and federally), but usually involves “some combination of showings that
the new evidence could not have been discovered prior to trial with the exercise
of reasonable diligence; that the evidence is relevant and not cumulative or merely
impeaching; and that the new evidence creates a sufficient probability of a differ-
ent result at a new trial.”4 Newly discovered evidence claims arise in a “melange
of direct and collateral remedies,” including motions for a new trial, statutory
procedures, court rules, applications for common law coram nobis relief, and
habeas corpus petitions.5
According to the Innocence Project, as of August, 2015, 330 people had
been exonerated by post-conviction DNA evidence in America.6 All of these in-
dividuals were – eventually – able to present “new” DNA evidence to a court in
order to secure post-conviction relief. Consequently, an inmate’s ability to apply
for a new trial (or evidentiary hearing) on the grounds of “newly discovered evi-
dence” has become a crucial feature of his post-conviction arsenal. Professor
Daniel Medwed considers that “more than ever... rules concerning newly discov-
ered evidence, have the potential to operate as the principal engine driving
[wrongful conviction] cases toward fair resolutions.”7
*Senior Lecturer in Law, Birmingham City University. Many thanks to Dr. Haydn Davies for his
helpful peer review and Amna Nazir and Alice Storey for their excellent editorial assistance.
1 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
2 Id.
3 Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 666 (2005).
4 Keith Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1197 (2011).
5 Medwed, supra note 3, at 675.
6 See The Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment (last visited Aug. 15, 2015).
7 Medwed, supra note 3, at 718.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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Nearly fifty-percent of the 330 DNA exonerations to date are attributable
to invalidated and/or unreliable forensic evidence.8 This is unsurprising. Recently,
a number of popular forensic identification methods – including those involving
the analysis of tool-marks, fingerprints, shoeprints, hairs and blood stain analysis
– have been significantly criticized for engaging in “individualization,” that is,
the practice of connecting a suspect uniquely with inculpatory evidence.9 In par-
ticular, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded in its landmark 2009
report – Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward
(NAS Report) – that “with the exception of DNA analysis... no forensic method
has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific
individual or source.”10 Soon after the report was published, the U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged that many forensic sciences are subject to “serious deficien-
cies.”11
Medwed considers that the “same problems that led to the wrongful con-
victions of those innocent prisoners later freed through DNA” – such as invali-
dated and/or improper forensic evidence – “presumably appear in the scores of
convictions procured without biological evidence.”12 This is supported by the fact
that the National Registry of Exonerations presents a higher number of wrongful
conviction cases impacted by faulty or misleading forensic evidence.13 In such –
non-DNA – cases inmates can present arguments that the forensic identification
evidence that contributed to their wrongful conviction was unreliable and/or im-
proper using newly discovered evidence procedures. Inmates can do this by argu-
ing that the criticism (generally couched as shifting scientific opinion or contro-
8 See Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php (last visited Aug.
15, 2015).
9 Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Encounters with Forensic
Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1082, 1119 (1998) (quoting another source).
10 THE COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING THE FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. Although note that DNA evidence is not
infallible. See Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science Challenges for Trial
Judges in Criminal Cases: Where the “Polybutadiene” Meets the “Bitumen”, 18 WIDENER L.J.
309, 320 (2009), at 323-24. Although DNA profiling is clearly scientifically superior to other
forensic identification evidence, it is not— contrary to earlier pronouncements—infallible. DNA
evidence and its underlying methodology are, of course, subject to human error. False positive
DNA results have occurred and will undoubtedly continue to be part of the DNA testing
landscape. Proffered evidence may still, as with other forensic science evidence, be the result of
mistakes or contamination in its collection, testing, or interpretation. As the technology and
methodology of DNA testing has progressed, it is the human errors that may present the biggest
evidentiary challenges for trial judges.
11 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009).
12 Medwed, supra note 3, at 657.
13 See A Project of the University of Michigan Law School, About the Registry, THE NATIONAL
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx
(last visited Aug. 16th, 2015).
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versy) levelled at these forensic identification methods is newly discovered evi-
dence. Consequently, the ability of states’ newly discovered evidence rules to ef-
fectively cater for such claims is crucial. At present, however, courts routinely
reject that “shifting scientific opinion or the existence of new scientific contro-
versy” is newly discovered evidence.14 In particular, the shift contained in the
NAS Report, in relation to a variety of forensic identification disciplines, seems
to have made little impact on appellate courts. In fact, Professors Simon Cole and
Gary Edmond in this Special Issue consider the NAS Report to be “a rather blunt
and impotent “weapon of the weak.””15
This article presents this pattern in judicial decision-making within two the-
oretical frameworks: the theory of finality and legal process theory. Part II con-
siders the interpretation and application of newly discovered evidence rules as
vehicles for post-conviction relief in the United States. Part III outlines the role of
forensic identification evidence both in the American criminal process generally,
and, as more recently discovered, the conviction of the innocent. It then considers
the impact of the 2009 NAS Report, as the most recent and quasi-official recog-
nition of the fallibility of forensic identification evidence. Part IV summarizes the
NAS Report’s findings in relation to the forensic disciplines associated with tool-
marks, fingerprints, shoe-prints, hairs and blood spatter and then explores the
courts’ routine rejection of newly discovered evidence claims based on arguments
that these forensic identification methods are subject to shifting scientific opinion
and/or controversy. The resulting doctrine demonstrates that appellate courts
show a strong desire to follow precedent that largely rejects shifting scientific
opinion as newly discovered evidence. By signalling that procedural regularity
legitimizes court decisions, as opposed to substantive accuracy, the courts are
applying classic tenets of legal process theory. Part V, therefore, critically consid-
ers how this pattern in judicial decision-making fits within legal process theory’s
central concept: the principle of institutional competence, by assessing the insti-
tutional strength of appellate courts to accurately assess indeterminacy. Part VI
concludes that the current judicial approach is problematic given the documented
role of unreliable and/or improper forensic evidence in convicting the innocent.
The courts should no longer hide behind procedural regularity to the detriment
of substantive accuracy, fill policy gaps with generalized finality interests, and
neglect their own institutional competence for providing the most accurate as-
sessment possible of newly discovered evidence claims based on shifting scientific
opinion.
14 See Part II and Part III of this article.
15 Simon A. Cole & Gary Edmond, Science Without Precedent: The Impact of the National
Research Council Report on the Admissibility and Use of Forensic Science Evidence in the United
States, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 585, 616 (2015); J.C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK:
EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1985).
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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II. THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE RULES IN THE UNITED STATES
Post-conviction newly-discovered-evidence claims “surface in a melange of
direct and collateral remedies.”16 These remedies include motions for a new trial,
statutory procedures, court rules and common law rules with coram nobis char-
acteristics, and habeas corpus petitions.17 The notion that a petitioner should be
able to obtain a new trial post-conviction can be traced back to late seventeenth
century England, and, later, to the First United States Congress, which permitted
new trials for “reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in courts
of law.”18 The states soon followed this trend, leading to the current state of
affairs whereby newly discovered evidence frameworks are considered “an inte-
gral part of the state court landscape for criminal defendants.”19 Through these
procedures, petitioners may present a wrongful conviction claim based on newly-
discovered non-DNA evidence, such as a claim based on shifting scientific opin-
ion or controversy.
At present, every state provides for a motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence (largely viewed as direct remedies), and a number of states
also allow newly discovered evidence as a ground for triggering collateral, post-
conviction relief procedures.20 Unlike traditional post-conviction remedies these
collateral procedures are primarily “fact based,”21 as opposed to being aimed at
remedying egregious legal errors of either “jurisdictional or constitutional dimen-
sions.”22 The standards for granting relief based on newly discovered evidence
differs from state-to-state (and federally), but Professor Keith Findley summarizes
that such standards usually,
… involve some combination of showings that the new evidence could not have
been discovered prior to trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence; that the
evidence is relevant and not cumulative or merely impeaching; and that the new
evidence creates a sufficient probability of a different result at a new trial.23
Newly discovered evidence standards impose onerous burdens on those
seeking relief. This is particularly problematic for petitioners convicted in part or
whole on the basis of erroneous forensic identification evidence. A basic decon-
struction of Findley’s generic formula of newly discovered evidence rules provides
a good example of why this is commonly the case. First, the petitioner must pre-
sent evidence that actually qualifies as newly discovered evidence, and ‘shifting
scientific opinion and controversy’ tends not to qualify.24 A specific example of
16 Medwed, supra note 3, at 675.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 666.
19 Id. at 665.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 664.
22 Id.
23 Keith Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157 (2011).
24 See Daniel G. Orenstein, Shaken to the Core: Emerging Scientific Opinion and Post-Conviction
Relief in Cases of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1305 (2010-11).
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this is Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS). The diagnostic triad used historically to
diagnose SBS has, in recent years, been significantly criticized.25 However, as one
commentator reports, “…federal courts reviewing SBS-based convictions have
been reticent to accept the argument that new scientific evidence meets the stand-
ard for federal habeas relief…”,26 noting this is attributable, in some way, to the
“high bar” petitioners must ‘jump’ to trigger post-conviction relief.27 The story
is largely the same in state courts too, with many not inclined “to open the door
to post-conviction relief on the basis of shifting scientific opinion or the existence
of new scientific controversy.”28 Second, the petitioner must bring the new fact
to the court within a reasonable time-frame after his conviction. However, shifts
in scientific opinion or the rise of controversy in a scientific discipline can take
decades to crystallize, as shown by the recent publication of the NAS Report in
2009, which criticized disciplines that have been employed in the criminal justice
system for decades. The shifts in medical opinion with regards to SBS also demon-
strate this slow burn effect.29 Moreover, science is widely understood to be a
methodology. The scientific method involves making observations, devising and
empirically testing hypotheses to explain those observations, and revising or
abandoning those hypotheses in a continual process. Consequently, a particular
school of thought may never objectively constitute a ‘scientific truth,’ since it is
always prone to replacement as the dominant theory following a shift in scientific
opinion. In other words, the crystallization of a ‘new’ scientific opinion – which
newly discovered evidence rules demand – is arguably a fiction. Third, the peti-
tioner must prove that the shifting scientific opinion and/or controversy is rele-
vant to his conviction in such a way that – if the jury had known about it – they
would have changed their verdict. Although it’s almost impossible to be certain
about what would have materially impacted a jury’s verdict, research shows that
scientific evidence – and in particular evidence of individualization – has a highly
persuasive impact on jurors.30 However, despite this, appellate courts routinely
find that the presentation of individualization evidence by forensic experts – alt-
hough arguably inaccurate and misleading – is harmless error and would not
have changed the jury’s verdict.31 Consequently, petitioners making such claims
have a very steep mountain to climb.
25 See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and
the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
26 Orenstein, supra note 24, at 1316.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Tuerkheimer, supra note 25.
30 See J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still
Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1206 (2010); D. McQuiston-Surrett & M. Saks,
Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact,
59 HASTINGS L.J. 1159 (2008); and Sarah Lucy Cooper, Judicial Responses to Challenges to
Firearms Identification Evidence: A Need for New Perspectives on Finality, 31 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 457 (2014).
31 See Cooper, supra note 30; Sarah Lucy Cooper, Challenges to Fingerprint Identification Evi-
dence: Why the Courts Need a New Approach to Finality, (forthcoming in WM. MITCHELL L.
REV.) (copy on file with author).
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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High standards for relief are “hallmarks” of the doctrine of finality.32 Newly
discovered evidence standards are neither easy to satisfy nor broadly interpreted
by the courts. As Medwed considers, “state courts have traditionally viewed
newly discovered evidence claims with disdain, fearing the impact of such claims
on the finality of judgments and the historic role of the jury as the true arbiter of
fact, and harboring doubts about the underlying validity of new evidence.”33 The
imposition of legal frameworks requiring such extraordinary showings has led to
an “inappropriately restrictive limitation on the criminal justices system's “ability
to correct injustices.”34 This is troublesome given that “More than ever…state
post-conviction procedures comprise the most appropriate vehicle to rectify
wrongful convictions and a subset of those procedures, the rules concerning
newly discovered evidence, have the potential to operate as the principal engine
driving cases toward fair resolutions.”35
The restrictive interpretation of newly discovered evidence rules is particu-
larly notable where petitioners argue that a shifting scientific opinion and/or con-
troversy within a forensic identification discipline qualifies as newly discovered
evidence. Part III, therefore, explores the historic role of forensic identification
evidence in the criminal justice process, before highlighting how the weaknesses
of such evidence have been exposed by recent DNA exonerations and the 2009
NAS Report, both of which petitioners have used to support newly discovered
claims based on shifting scientific opinion.
III. THE ROLE OF FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS, DNA EXONERATIONS AND THE
2009 NAS REPORT.
Forensic identification evidence is a mainstay of the American criminal jus-
tice system;36 however it is also linked to nearly fifty percent of the known post-
conviction DNA testing exonerations to date.37 The fallibility of various forensic
science disciplines was most recently catalogued, by the National Academy of
Sciences in its 2009 report: Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States:
A Path Forward. This section considers the role of forensic identification evidence
in the criminal justice process and in convicting the innocent, and the impact of
the NAS Report.
32 Sarah Lucy Cooper, The State Clemency Power and Innocence Claims: The Influence of
Finality and Its Implications for Innocents, CHARLOTTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (Copy on file
with Author).
33 Medwed, supra note 3.
34 Id.
35 Findley, supra note 23, at 1198.
36 See Sarah Lucy Cooper, The Collision of Law and Science: American Court Responses to
Developments in Forensic Science, 33 PACE L. REV. 234 (2013).
37 See Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, supra note 8.
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A. THE ROLE OF FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS AND IN CONVICTING THE INNOCENT
Forensic identification evidence has long played a role in the American crim-
inal justice process. Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, American courts have
embraced the notion that a plethora of forensic identification disciplines (known
as the soft sciences) can engage in individualization, i.e., identify a perpetrator to
the “exclusion of all others.” For instance, courts have routinely accepted that
fingerprints can uniquely identify the perpetrator of a crime, suspect notes can be
“matched” to a suspect’s handwriting, bite-marks on a victim can be “matched”
to a suspect’s teeth, bullets from a suspect’s gun can be “matched” to suspect
ammunition, and a suspect’s vehicle tyres, shoes and hairs can be “matched” to
prints and hairs left at a crime scene respectively. At the close of the 20th Century,
forensic identification evidence became even more pivotal, as the power of DNA38
evidence to both ‘catch’ the guilty and exonerate the innocent was discovered.39
With the discovery of the power of DNA, came the birth of the American
Innocence Movement. In 1992, Barry C. Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld formed The
Innocence Project “to assist prisoners who could be proven innocent through
DNA testing.”40 By the end of 1993, 135 people had been exonerated,41 including
14 whose innocence had been conclusively proven by post-conviction DNA evi-
dence. Over the last two decades, the number of DNA exonerations has contin-
ued to grow, along with an increased understanding of the propensity of the
criminal justice system to generate factual errors. The concept of “innocence” is
now a burgeoning feature of legal, social and political discourse,42 with the Inno-
cence Movement described as “the most dramatic development in the criminal
justice world since the Warren Court’s Due Process Revolution of the 1960s.”43
As of August, 2015, 330 people had been exonerated by post-conviction
DNA testing in America, and the capacity of DNA evidence to identify specific
sources consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, has been rigorously
tested.44 DNA evidence has become a gold-standard, raising the bar for what is
38 Shelton, supra note 10, at 309: “DNA is the molecular structure in all living things that contains
genetic information. DNA evidence is very durable and can be extracted from the smallest of
remains many years after a crime. Equally significant is its “polymorphism,” meaning that,
depending on the method used for its extraction, it is unique among humans and can identify the
donor of the specimen with overwhelming accuracy. DNA testing can be extremely precise and
can often demonstrate that only one person in billions could have been the source of the specimen
evidence.”.
39 Cooper, supra note 36.
40 About Us, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/about-innocence-project (last
visited Aug. 16, 2015).
41 A Project of the University of Michigan Law School, Browse the National Registry of
Exonerations, THE NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
42 See generally CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed.,
2014).
43 Keith A. Findley, Innocence Found: Thee New Revolution in American Criminal Justice in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 1 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).
44 NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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scientifically acceptable for identifying a source to the exclusion of all others.45
DNA technology has exposed the fallibility of numerous forensic disciplines, with
forty-seven percent of the wrongful convictions that led to the known 330 DNA
exonerations being attributed, in some way, to unreliable and/or improper foren-
sic evidence.46 Naturally, this has provoked significant concern about the ability
of the soft sciences to engage in individualization. This concern was both solidi-
fied and stoked by the 2009 NAS Report.
B. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A
PATH FORWARD
In 2005, recognizing the existence of concern about the reliability of forensic
science and that significant improvements were required across the discipline,
Congress commissioned the National Academy of Sciences– one of the world’s
premier sources of independent, expert advice on scientific issues – to report on
the past, present, and future use of forensic science in America.47 The Academy
spent two years collaborating with legal and scientific scholars, practitioners and
other professionals.48 It heard over eighty witnesses during sixteen days of testi-
mony,49 and issued its final report in February, 2009. The report was billed as a
“'blockbuster” that would overhaul the legal landscape relating to forensic evi-
dence.50 The report addressed a wide range of relevant topics including an over-
view of the forensic community and need for integrated governance, the methods
and veracity of various forensic disciplines (including tool-marks, fingerprints,
shoeprints, hair analysis and blood stain pattern analysis), the admission and in-
terpretation of scientific data, methods for improvement, and education and
training.51
The report made some important observations and impacts. First, the report
concluded that the forensic science system had “serious problems,”52 faced many
45 Id. at 8.
46 See Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, supra note 8.
47 NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at xix (preface).
48Id. at xix – xx (preface).
49Id. at 2.
50 Jacqueline McMurtrie, Swirls and Whorls: Litigating Post-Conviction Claims of Fingerprint
Misidentification after the NAS Report, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 267, 267 (2010).
51 See generally NAS REPORT, supra note 10.
52 NAS REPORT, supra note 10 at xx (preface). (“In considering the testimony and evidence that
was presented to the committee, what surprised us the most was the consistency of the message
that we heard: The forensic science system, encompassing both research and practice, has serious
problems that can only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current structure
that supports the forensic science community in this country. This can only be done with effective
leadership at the highest levels of both federal and state governments, pursuant to national
standards, and with a significant infusion of federal funds.”).
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challenges,53 and was accountable for multiple, wrongful convictions.54 On the
basis of the evidence before it, the NAS concluded, inter alia, that (1) “with the
exception of DNA analysis... no forensic method has been rigorously shown to
have the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demon-
strate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source;”55 and
(2) the existing legal framework governing the admissibility of forensic evidence
in the United States was inadequate for resolving the problems identified.56 The
bottom line was simple: “In a number of forensic science disciplines, forensic
science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or
the accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in
addressing this problem.”57
Second, the report drew an unprecedented conclusion, namely that DNA
was the only forensic method that had been rigorously shown to have the capac-
ity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, engage in individualiza-
tion; thereby casting a new and officially-stamped critical light onto the soft sci-
ences58 Third, the report provided a level of repose for exonerees convicted in
whole or part by erroneous forensic evidence. It did this by acknowledging the
deficiencies that had led to their wrongful convictions. For instance, exonerees
like Kennedy Brewer and Dwayne Allen Dail (as well as relatives of victims who
had suffered through the conviction of the wrong assailant) welcomed the re-
port’s findings and recommendations.59 Fourth, for those engaging in innocence
work, it was apparent the report could serve as a valuable resource for future,
credible innocence claims based on erroneous forensic identification evidence.
For instance, a press statement released by the Innocence Project stated “In a
watershed development that could transform forensic science nationwide, the
National Academy of Sciences today released a comprehensive report finding that
53Id. at 4-5 (summary). These challenges range from the lack of mandatory standardization,
certification, and accreditation to problems associated with the interpretation of forensic
evidence, to the need for research to establish limits and measures of performance.
54Id. at 4 (summary). (“Those advances [DNA evidence testing], however, also have revealed
that, in some cases, substantive information and testimony based on faulty forensic science
analyses may have contributed to wrongful convictions of innocent people. This fact has
demonstrated the potential danger of giving undue weight to evidence and testimony derived from
imperfect testing and analysis. Moreover, imprecise or exaggerated expert testimony has
sometimes contributed to the admission of erroneous or misleading evidence.”).
55Id. at 7 (summary).
56Id. at 85. (“The report finds that the existing legal regime—including the rules governing the
admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable standards governing appellate review of trial
court decisions, the limitations of the adversary process, and judges and lawyers who often lack
the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence—is inadequate
to the task of curing the documented ills of the forensic science disciplines.”).
57 Id. at 53.
58 Id. at 7.
59Reactions to Groundbreaking National Academy of Sciences Report Urging Reform in U.S.
Forensic Sciences, INNOCENCE PROJECT, (Feb. 18, 2009, 12:00 AM),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Reactions_to_Groundbreaking_National_Academy_o
f_Sciences_Report_Urging_Reform_in_US_Forensic_Sciences.php.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
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the forensic sciences need significantly strengthened oversight, research and sup-
port in order to play a more reliable role in identifying perpetrators of crime,
protecting the wrongly accused and ensuring public safety.”60 Peter Neufeld, co-
director of the Innocence Project commented “… forensic science professionals
have not had the support or management needed to identify the real strengths
and weaknesses of different assays and techniques…This report provides the
roadmap for rectifying that problem, and we look forward to working with Con-
gress and other key stakeholders to implement the report’s recommendations.”61
However, generally, the NAS Report (and other catalogued criticism of fo-
rensic identification evidence) has had limited impact. First, it has failed to turn
the heads of the judiciary when it comes to the admissibility of forensic identifi-
cation evidence. Despite the NAS Report’s findings, trial judges continue to ad-
mit, often unreservedly, forensic identification evidence that engages with indi-
vidualization.62 Moreover, appellate judges continue to defer to such trial court
decisions, and/ or find the admission of such forensic identification evidence was
a “harmless error” or lawful due to the fact defense counsel had the opportunity
to challenge it (whether or not they did so effectively).63 Furthermore, the Re-
port’s findings and other such criticism has, on the whole, failed to persuade ap-
pellate judges that there has been a shift in scientific opinion or generation of
controversy, within relevant forensic identification disciplines, which qualifies as
“newly discovered evidence.” Part III presents this pattern in judicial decision-
making, and offers the findings of NAS Report, in relation to the forensic disci-
plines associated with tool-marks, fingerprints, hairs, shoe-prints and blood spat-
ter, to provide a flavour of the basis upon which petitioners have made newly
discovered evidence arguments that there has been a shift in scientific opinion.
IV. THE FINDINGS OF THE 2009 NAS REPORT AND JUDICIAL
RESPONSES TO NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE CLAIMS BASED
ON SHIFTING SCIENTIFIC OPINION AND/OR CONTROVERSY IN
FORENSIC DISCIPLINES
The 2009 NAS Report was a watershed publication, subjecting both the
previously known and unknown deficiencies of a variety of popular forensic iden-
tification methods to the condemnation of America’s premier scientific organiza-
tion. Moreover, for the first time, following an assessment of forensic science as
a whole the NAS found “with the exception of DNA analysis... no forensic
method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with
a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a spe-
cific individual or source.”64 In other words, it cast, new significant doubt, on the
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62 See generally Cooper, supra note 36.
63 See Cooper, supra note 30; Cooper, supra note 31.
64 NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at 7.
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ability of many popular forensics identification methods to engage in individual-
ization. Subsequently, the NAS Report has served as a basis for post-conviction
newly discovered evidence claims, with defendants arguing that it represents
shifting scientific opinion and/or controversy in a forensic discipline associated
with their conviction.
This section explores judicial responses to such newly discovered evidence
claims. My dataset comprises ten cases. I identified my dataset via a Westlaw
search using the terms (and synonymous terms) “National Academy of Sciences,”
“newly discovered evidence,” and “individualization” in a variety of combina-
tions. The dates of my searches were restricted to cases occurring between 2009
and 2014 to coincide with the publication of the NAS Report. The ten cases have
been divided into two categories: Category One comprises tool-mark (firearms)
cases. This category includes standard tool-mark identification cases and Com-
parative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA) cases. Category Two comprises other fo-
rensic identification methods cases. This category includes cases involving newly
discovered evidence claims based on criticisms of the methods involved in finger-
print analysis, hair analysis, shoe-print analysis and blood stain pattern analysis.
Before exploring judicial responses in each category, sub-section (i) sets out some
of the specific findings of the NAS Report in relation to each of these forensic
disciplines, in order to provide a sense of a petitioner’s perspective on the alleged
“scientific shift and/or controversy” in each discipline.
A. THE 2009 NAS REPORT’S FINDINGS: TOOL-MARKS, FINGER-
PRINTS, MICROSCOPIC HAIR ANALYSIS, SHOE-PRINTS, AND BLOOD
STAIN PATTERNS.
i. Firearms Identification – Tool-mark Analysis
The NAS Report found that class characteristics “can be useful in narrowing
the pool of tools that may have left a distinctive mark,”65 and that individual
characteristics “might, in some cases, be distinctive enough to suggest one par-
ticular source.”66 However, overall, the report concluded that the “scientific
knowledge base for tool mark and firearms analysis is fairly limited.”67 In order
to make the process of individualization more precise and repeatable, the report
concluded “additional studies should be performed.”68 It further concluded that
the AFTE Protocol was not defined in a sufficiently precise way for examiners to




68Id. at 154. Some studies have been performed to consider the degree of similarity that can be
found between marks made by different tools and the variability in marks made by individual
tool.
69Id. at 155. (“… AFTE has adopted a theory of identification, but it does not provide a specific
protocol. It says that an examiner may offer an opinion that a specific tool or firearm was the
source of a specific set of tool-marks...“sufficient agreement” exists in the pattern of two sets of
marks. It defines agreement as significant “when it exceeds the best agreement demonstrated
between tool marks known to have been produced by different tools and is consistent with the
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
662
The report berated the protocol, stating “This AFTE document, which is the best
guidance available for the field of tool mark identification, does not even con-
sider, let alone address, questions regarding variability, reliability, repeatability,
or the number of correlations needed to achieve a given degree of confidence.”70
ii. Fingerprint Identification - Friction Ridge Analysis
The NAS Report acknowledged that friction ridge analysis had long “served
as a valuable tool, both to identify the guilty and exclude the innocent,”71 and
gave some support to the discipline’s ability to engage in individualization. Due
to the amount of detail available in friction ridges, the NAS opined that “it seems
plausible that a careful comparison of two impressions can accurately discern
whether or not they had a common source.”72 The report agreed that some sci-
entific evidence supports the presumption that friction ridge patterns are unique
and remain unchanged throughout a lifetime.73
However, the report also found that the discipline was not “properly” un-
derpinned.74 The NAS Report’s criticism spanned four areas. First, the ‘Analysis,
Comparison, Evaluation and Verification’ method (ACE-V) is not “specific”
enough to qualify as a validated method because it “does not guard against bias;
is too broad to ensure repeatability and transparency; and does not guarantee
that two analysts following it will obtain the same results.”75 Thus, following
ACE-V did not mean that one was “proceeding in a scientific manner or produc-
ing reliable results.”76 Second, examiners need to better document their analysis.77
Third, claims of a zero error-rate are clearly “unrealistic.”78 Fourth, more re-
search is needed into ridge patterns and distribution, discriminating values and
items that affect the quality of latent prints.79
iii. Microscopic Hair Analysis
The NAS Report acknowledged that because human and animal hairs are
routinely shed, it makes it possible for hairs to be transferred from an individual
agreement demonstrated by tool marks known to have been produced by the same tool.” The
meaning of “exceeds the best agreement” and “consistent with” are not specified, and the








77Id. at 143. (“Better documentation is needed of each step in the ACE-V process or its equivalent.
At the very least, sufficient documentation is needed to reconstruct the analysis, if necessary.”)
78Id.
79Id. at 144-45. (The NAS Report acknowledged that “Some research has recently begun to into
ridge flow and crease pattern distribution on the hands and feet and research into the
discriminating value of the various ridge formations and clusters of ridge formations.”).
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to a crime scene.80 The report noted that examiners can generally recognize vari-
ous physical characteristics of hairs, which are sufficiently different among indi-
viduals, to allow people to be included or excluded from having donated them.81
However, the NAS Report concluded that no scientifically accepted statistics ex-
ist about the frequency with which particular characteristics of hair are distrib-
uted in the population.82 Moreover, the report found that there are seemingly no
uniform standards on the number of features on which hairs must agree before
an examiner may declare a “match” between a suspect hair and a suspect; finding
that the categorization of hair features depends heavily on an examiner’s profi-
ciency and practical experience.83 Ultimately, the NAS Report concluded that
there was “no scientific support for the use of hair comparisons for individuali-
zation in the absence of nuclear DNA.”84
iv. Impression Evidence – Shoeprints
The NAS Report noted that the scientific basis for the evaluation of impres-
sion evidence is that mass-produced items (such as shoes and tyres) pick up fea-
tures of wear that, over time, individualize them.85 However, because these fea-
tures continue to change as the items are used, elapsed time after a crime can
undercut a forensic scientist’s certainty.86 Class characteristics (amongst a partic-
ular batch of shoes, for example) can be identified, but there is no consensus
about how many individual characteristics are required to make a “match” be-
tween a batch item and a suspect one. The NAS Report found that necessary
research into validity, reliability, variables, and population studies was absent,
and that even the most experienced examiners should avoid biases in experience-
based judgments, especially in the absence of a feedback mechanism to correct
an erroneous judgment.87
v. Blood Stain Pattern Analysis
The NAS Report found that some scientific studies “support some aspects
of bloodstain pattern analysis.”88 For instance, the report accepted that it can be
known whether blood was spattered quickly or slowly.89 However, the report
also stated that some experts “extrapolate far beyond what can be supported.”90
The NAS concluded that given the complexity of assessments involved in such
analysis, great care must be taken about how such expert testimony is presented
80 Id. at 155.
81 Id. at 156.
82 Id. at 160.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 149.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 178.
89 Id.
90 Id.
4 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2015)
664
in court.91 The report concluded, however, that at present “The uncertainties as-
sociated with blood stain pattern analysis are enormous.”92
B. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO NEWLY DISCOVERED VIDENCE CLAIMS
BASED ON SHIFTING SCIENTIFIC OPINION AND/OR CONTROVERSY
IN FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION DISCIPLINES
i. Category One: Firearms Identification Cases
It is unsurprising that the majority of the cases identified involve newly dis-
covered claims related to the veracity of firearms identification evidence. This is
because firearms identification evidence has been the subject of the most notable
shift in judicial opinion. Since 2005 there has been a trend, by some courts, to
direct expert testimony away from claims of individualization i.e., away from
allowing experts to testify to a “match” between a specific firearm and suspect
ammunition.93 These courts have, overall, taken such an approach because of
concerns about the subjectivity of firearms identification and its lack of empirical
underpinnings for claims of individualization.94 The cases in this category can be
divided into two sub-categories: (1) standard tool-mark cases; and (2) CBLA
cases.
a. Standard Tool-mark Cases
The courts have been generally reluctant to accept that shifting scientific
opinion and/or controversy in the field of firearms identification qualifies as
newly discovered evidence. For instance, in the 2011 case of Rues v Denney,95
Denney argued that the NAS Report constituted newly discovered evidence,
which would extend his limitations period. Denney argued, inter alia, that the
NAS Report called into question the processes for comparing bunter marks from
firearm shells to other, unfired shells: a method of analysis that had led to evi-
dence contributing to his conviction. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the U.S. District Court’s finding that the report was not “new evidence,”
accepting the lower court’s reasoning that the criticism contained in the NAS
Report was not “new.” This was because the criticisms had been raised previ-
ously in academic journals. As such, the criticisms were discoverable prior to
2009. As such, the appellate court found that the NAS Report did not “constitute
a new fact,” because it did not “raise any new issues.” 96
91 Id. at 179.
92 Id.
93 See United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005); United States v. Monteiro,
407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006); United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
94 Cooper, supra note 36.
95 643 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2011).
96 Id. at 622.
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In Foster v Florida,97 the Supreme Court of Florida also rejected the argu-
ment that the findings contained in the NAS Report were newly discovered evi-
dence. The court found that Foster had failed to meet the required standards for
newly discovered evidence, namely that he needed to “allege sufficient facts
showing that the evidence was unknown by the trial court, the party, or his coun-
sel, and that his counsel could not have known of it by use of due diligence”,98
and “if the evidence is newly discovered, it must be such that on retrial the de-
fendant would probably be acquitted.”99 The court applied precedent (Johnston
v State discussed infra) where it had rejected a similar claim on the basis that (1)
the NAS Report cited to existing publications before the crime was committed
and others that were published during the time that the petitioner was seeking
post-conviction relief; and (2) the report lacked specificity “that would justify a
conclusion that it provides a basis to find the forensic evidence admitted at trial
to be infirm or faulty.... Nothing in the report renders the forensic techniques
used in this case unreliable…”100 The Florida Supreme Court found the same
reasoning applied to Foster, citing additional precedents where research studies
had failed to qualify as sources of newly discovered evidence,101 and noting that
Foster had failed to identify how the relevant research “would demonstrate, in
any specific way, that the testing methods or opinions in his case were defi-
cient.”102
Similarly, in the 2011 case of Arizona v Rodriguez103 the petitioner argued,
inter alia, that the NAS Report constituted newly discovered evidence that would
have challenged the testimony of the state's ballistics expert, and changed the
outcome of his trial. In a memorandum opinion, the Arizona Court of Appeals
(Division 2) rejected Rodriguez’s claim, finding the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying post-conviction relief. The court described the trial court’s
decision as “thorough”104 and offered no further reasoning for the rejection of
the claim. Notably, however, the same Arizona court did provide a form of relief
in the 2014 case of Arizona v Celaya.105 In that case, Celaya argued that his trial
court erred when it denied him an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the NAS
Report’s findings “debunking the certainty of firearms comparison analysis”106
constituted newly discovered evidence. At Celaya’s trial, two state experts had
testified that there was “no doubt”107 that a bullet found in Celaya’s truck was
fired by the same gun that killed the victims. In other words, the experts had
claimed individualization. The appellate court determined that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to have an evidentiary hearing, but refused to
97 132 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2013).
98 Id. at 71.




103 Not Reported in P.3d, 2011 WL 6916543 (Ariz. App. Div. 2).
104 Id. at 2.
105 Not Reported in P.3d, 2014 WL 4244049 (Ariz. App. Div. 2).
106 Id. at 5.
107 Id.
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comment of whether the NAS report was in fact newly discovered evidence (with-
out such a hearing). The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing, rejecting the
state’s claim that one was unnecessary.108
Despite signalling that the review of such issues must occur, the decision in
Celeya fed into the conservative trend by appellate courts to (1) defer to lower
court decisions regarding the qualification of newly discovered evidence; and (2)
not label the findings of the NAS Report (including the unprecedented finding
that individualization was not proper in forensic disciplines such as firearms iden-
tification) as newly discovered evidence. As it stands, the cases in this sub-section
show that the shift in scientific opinion contained in the NAS, with regards to
firearms identification evidence, fails to qualify as newly discovered evidence.
This is largely because courts take the view it presents no “new” facts given that
it cites to older research and lacks specificity to individual cases. With regard to
specificity, Cole and Edmond have noted how the judiciary’s “intense focus on
the case, the particular witness, their opinion and its relation to facts in is-
sue…”109 has made it difficult for petitioners to apply general concerns from the
NAS Report to “…specific case-based evidence relevant to prosecutions and ap-
peals.”110 As Cole and Edmond point out, “Courts are interested in relevant—
that is, probative—evidence bearing on facts in issue in the specific proceed-
ings.”111 This view is palpable in the cases explored in this sub-section (and
throughout Part III). As it stands, petitioners are failing to bridge the gap between
the NAS Report’s findings and the impact they have on the evidence in their cases.
This failure tends to be fatal for the “verdict changing capacity” requirement of
newly discovered evidence rules.
b. CBLA Cases
The use of CBLA evidence was discontinued in 2004, after a report ques-
tioning its validity was published by the National Academy of Sciences (CBLA
NAS Report).112 Historically, CBLA evidence had been used to show that "bullets
came from the same box, the same manufacturer, were related in time or geogra-
phy, or generally linked the defendant to the crime in some unspecified man-
ner.”113 Since 2004, some defendants have used this shift in scientific opinion as
108 Id. at 6.
109 Cole & Edmond, supra note 15 at 595.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 597
112 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, REPORT IN BRIEF, FORENSIC ANALYSIS:
WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 1 (2004).
113 Id. (“The FBI commissioned the National Research Council (“NRC”) to evaluate its use of
CBLA and, following the Council's 2004 report, discontinued its use of CBLA at trials. The NRC
report demonstrates that the problem with CBLA is not that the method used to compare the
contents of two bullets is unreliable in some abstract sense, but that it is unreliable to conclude
that a CBLA “match” supports further specific factual assertions put forth at trial. Most often,
these assertions are that matching bullets came from the same box, the same manufacturer, were
related in time or geography, or generally linked the defendant to the crime in some unspecified
manner. Crucially, these conclusions rested on assumptions unsupported by scientific and
statistical testing of the general bullet manufacturing process. See Nat'l Res. Council at 112–13.
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a basis for newly discovered evidence claims. Unlike the claims identified in sub-
section (a) above, however, these claims have generally triggered judicial inter-
vention in favor of the petitioner.
For example, in Zamarippa v Florida,114 Zamarippa based his newly discov-
ered evidence claim on a 2007 Washington Post article that detailed the contro-
versy surrounding CBLA, including a reference to the CBLA NAS Report.115 Ap-
plying the earlier decision of Murphy v State,116 in which the same court had held
that the CBLA NAS Report might qualify as newly discovered evidence, the court
held that the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine, inter
alia, whether newly discovered evidence on CBLA would probably produce ac-
quittal on retrial. The ruling overturned that of the lower court, and continued
the idea that there was some judicial acceptance that the shift in scientific opinion
with regards to CBLA evidence qualified as newly discovered evidence.
In the 2010 case of Smith v Florida,117 a Florida court labelled the shift in
scientific opinion with regards to CBLA evidence as newly discovered evidence.
In that case, Smith alleged that the CBLA method, which had been used by an
FBI analyst who testified at his murder trials in 1989 and 1990, had been subse-
quently discredited by scientific research and abandoned by the FBI as unreliable.
Smith cited the November 2007 joint-investigation by The Washington Post and
CBS News in its “60 Minutes” feature and the CBLA NAS Report, which con-
cluded that CBLA could not reliably support testimony that a bullet came from
a particular box of ammunition.118 The District Court of Appeal held that Smith
had sufficiently alleged that evidence that CBLA had been discredited and aban-
doned was unknown at the time of his trials, and could not have been discovered
by the use of due diligence and provided relief. In so holding, the court cited
precedents that CBLA had been held inadmissible on the basis that they were
scientifically unreliable.119
However, firing a shot across the bows of lawyers who were minded to in-
terpret the Smith decision as a liberal shift in judicial thought on newly discovered
First, the NRC found that a CBLA match supports the inference that two bullets came from the
same “source” when taken to mean a compositionally indistinguishable volume of lead (“CIVL”).
But there was no generally reliable evidence that a CBLA match corresponded to a match among
any other type of “source,” such as a specific manufacturer, box, time, location, etc. See id. at
106–07. Thus, it remained in many cases a distinct possibility that while bullets from the same
“source” match each other, they also match bullets from any number of “sources.” Second, there
was no general knowledge of the probability that manufacturing variations would result in two
different lead sources randomly producing matching bullets, producing what is known as a “false
positive.” Id. at 107 (“Although it has been demonstrated that there are a large number of different
[CIVL's], there is evidence that bullets from different CIVL[']s can sometimes coincidentally be
analytically indistinguishable.”) (quoting: Kulbicki v. State of Maryland, 207 Md. App. 412, 53
A.3d 361 at 439-40).
114 100 So.3d 746 (Fla. App. 2 Dist., 2012).
115 Id. at 747.
116 24 So.3d 1220 (Fla. App. 2 Dist., 2009).
117 23 So.3d 1277 (Fla. App. 2 Dist., 2010).
118 Id. at 1278.
119 Id.
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claims involving a shift in scientific opinion, in a special concurring judgment,
Judge Altenbernd stated that,
…a change in scientific opinion within a relevant scientific community-a
change that occurred almost twenty years after the trial in this case-may require
a different postconviction analysis than the typical claim of newly discovered
evidence.120
The judge went on to explain his view that when a defendant is arguing that
evidence properly admitted would no longer be admissible due to advances in
scientific knowledge or theory, he “should have a heavy burden to establish that
the admitted evidence was critical to the conviction.”121 This was largely because
such advancements in ‘soft science’ forensic disciplines, like CBLA, were not com-
parable to those in DNA testing. The judge explained,
CBLA normally allowed for testimony that a bullet involved in a crime was
consistent with other bullets in the possession of the defendant, but those bul-
lets may have come from a manufacturing batch that may have contained thou-
sands of additional comparable bullets. In other words, CBLA allowed for cir-
cumstantial evidence suggesting a connection between the defendant and the
bullet involved in the crime. Thus, the recent shift in scientific thought may
reduce the amount of circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant to the
offense, but it should not result in any affirmative evidence exonerating the
convicted defendant.122
As such, Judge Altenbernd was not “completely convinced” that the normal
test used for newly discovered evidence, i.e. that it would probably change the
result, should be the test controlling this post-conviction issue.123 When the
change in scientific thought occurs many years after the conviction, the judge was
inclined to “believe that the defendant should be required to establish a higher
degree of certainty that the change in evidence would have altered the jury's ver-
dict.”124
The cases in sub-section (b) suggest that courts have treated shifts in scien-
tific opinion about CBLA evidence more favourably, allowing such claims to
qualify as newly discovered evidence. Concerns about the ‘newness’ of the criti-
cism aimed at CBLA evidence and how probative that criticism is to a particular
case (given it comes from sources detached from the specific case at hand) have
seemingly been side-lined. The difference between how courts have treated newly
discovered evidence claims related to standard tool-mark analysis and those in-
volving CBLA evidence raises a question about how the 2009 NAS Report differs
from the CBLA NAS Report. Cole and Edmond point out that,
Strengthening can be distinguished from earlier NRC reports in both its
breadth and implications. The earlier NRC reports provided recommendations
that were more constrained. They could be more readily identified, understood
120 Id. at 1279 (Altenbernd, J., concurring).
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and acted upon. Their recommendations applied to a small set of issues or
cases, although DNA profiling was in the process of rapid expansion. Con-
versely, many of the concerns in Strengthening are diffuse: applicable to a very
large number of current and legacy cases. In the absence of clear guidance and
in the face of daunting logistical complexity, it is perhaps not surprising that
courts have been cautious in their response to a report with incredibly disrup-
tive potential.125
In addition, the changes promulgated by the 2004 CBLA NAS Report also
had the rubber stamp of the FBI. The FBI forced the discontinuance of CBLA
evidence in 2004, whereas the forensic disciplines criticized for making claims of
individualization by the NAS Report 2009 have continued routinely to make such
claims post-2009.126 This difference might be related to the different roles (and
perhaps perceived importance by the judiciary) of the FBI and NAS. The FBI is
the premier criminal investigation and law enforcement agency in America, and
therefore has a great deal of weight when it comes to changing practices that
effect criminal investigations. By contrast, the NAS is a self-described “non-profit
society of distinguished scholars.”127 The NAS simply doesn’t undertake the same
practically potent role as the FBI. Unlike the FBI, the NAS has considerable dis-
tance from the routine grind of criminal investigations, including the application
of the forensic identification methods such investigations involve.
ii. Category Two: Other Forensic Identification Methods Cases
This category includes newly discovered evidence claims based on shifting
scientific opinion with regards to the methods involved in fingerprint analysis,
microscopic hair analysis, shoe-print analysis and blood stain pattern analysis.
Overall, the courts have been reluctant to find that any of the conclusions of the
NAS Report (relevant to these disciplines) are a scientific shift and/or controversy
that qualifies as newly discovered evidence.
In the 2010 case of Johnston v State,128 the petitioner argued that the NAS
Report constituted newly discovered evidence that proved he was convicted on
“infirm forensic evidence.”129 The forensic evidence in his case involved finger-
prints, shoeprints and blood stain patterns. The appellate court rejected his claim,
affirming the lower court’s decision. The appellate court’s decision that the NAS
Report did not qualify as newly discovered evidence was two-fold. First, the court
found, the NAS Report cited to existing publications, which negated any argu-
ment that its findings were “new.”130 Second, the report lacked the specificity
125 Cole & Edmond, supra note 15 at 614.
126 See generally Cooper, supra note 36.
127 NAS Mission, THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, http://www.nasonline.org/about-
nas/mission/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015).
128 27 So.3d 11 (Fla. 2010).
129 Id. at 16.
130 Id. at 21.
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that would justify a conclusion that it provides a basis to find the forensic evi-
dence admitted at trial to be infirm or faulty.131 In so holding, the court found
that one statement in the NAS Report was “particularly telling,”132 namely that:
The committee decided early in its work that it would not be feasible to develop
a detailed evaluation of each discipline in terms of its scientific underpinning,
level of development, and ability to provide evidence to address the major types
of questions raised in criminal prosecutions and civil litigation.133
One of these “major types” of questions clearly related to the admissibility
of forensic identification evidence in criminal proceedings. As Judge Harry Ed-
wards, the Co-Chair of the NAS Report Committee, stated to a Congressional
committee: “whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible under
applicable law is not coterminous with the question whether there are studies
confirming the scientific validity and reliability of a forensic science discipline.”134
This particular statement has been used to support claims that the NAS Report’s
findings should neither render inadmissible the forensic identification methods
criticized in the NAS Report, nor should the criticism represent a shift in scientific
opinion that undermines all convictions these disciplines have contributed to se-
curing. Judge Edwards has since rejected such conclusions.135 Cole and Edmond
agree that the NAS Report did not advize on admissibility specifically, but suggest
it would “…be misleading to suggest that it is not relevant to admissibility deter-
minations.”136
Nonetheless, the Johnston court persisted with the idea that the NAS Report
did not “establish that any particular test, test result, or specific testimony pre-
sented at Mr. Johnston's trial was faulty or otherwise subject to challenge”137 and
was merely “a new or updated discussion of issues regarding developments in
forensic testing.”138 As such, it did not constitute evidence that was not known
at trial and could not have been ascertained through due diligence. Moreover,
Johnston had not demonstrated how, in any specific way, the testing methods or
opinions in his case were deficient.
In the 2014 case of Enderle v Iowa,139 the petitioner claimed that the NAS
Report constituted newly discovered evidence that undermined his conviction on
the basis that it challenged the validity of fingerprint evidence against him. The
Iowa court questioned whether the report was “evidence” within the meaning of
the state’s newly discovered evidence rule. However, even if it was, because
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 21.
134 Statement of Judge Harry T. Edwards, Co–Chair, Committee on Identifying the Needs of the
Forensic Science Community , before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
March 18, 2009. Statement can be accessed at:
http://www.latent-prints.com/images/NAS%20Congressional%20Testimony%20Mar09.pdf.
135 Cole & Edmond, supra note 15 at 591-92.
136 Id. at 592
137 Johnston, supra note 128, at 20.
138 Id. at 21.
139 847 N.W.2d 235 (Table), 2014 WL 956018 (Iowa App.).
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Enderle admitted similar articles (containing such criticism about fingerprint ev-
idence) appeared before his trial, his concession was “dispositive of the issue.”140
Without further exploration, the court found the NAS Report was not newly
discovered evidence.
Similarly, in the 2013 case of Pennsylvania v Edmiston,141 hairs in Edmis-
ton’s truck had been “matched” to a murder victim. The court found that the
NAS Report’s findings about the imprecision of microscopic hair analysis did not
provide a basis for applying a newly discovered facts exception to timeliness re-
quirements for filing a petition for post-conviction relief. In so holding, the ap-
pellate court ruled that the analysis of the scientific principles supporting hair
comparison analysis and the facts compiled in the NAS Report were not new, but
existed in various sources prior to the publication of the NAS Report. The lower
court had found that “to the extent the NAS Report contained a specific exami-
nation of the scientific support for various methodologies of hair analysis, it qual-
ified as new information.”142 However, the lower court also observed that the
deficiencies of forensic science were “nothing new, and commonly form the basis
for attacks on expert testimony in the court room.”143 What was new, in the
lower court's view, however, was that these deficiencies had been “collected, in-
vestigated, and studied in a report bearing the imprimatur of the NAS.”144 The
lower court rejected Edmiston’s claim on the merits, however. This was on the
basis that the expert testimony in his case did not individualize the hair found in
his truck to the victim, and, therefore, was not inconsistent with the NAS Re-
port.145 It further commented that the newly discovered information in the NAS
Report would be useful only for impeachment and, moreover, would not have
changed the outcome of the trial.146 The appellate court did not interfere with
this finding.
The appellate court did, however, expand on the issue of what constituted
a newly discovered fact, finding that the claim was untimely. The court stated
that,
to constitute facts which were unknown to a petitioner and could not have
been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, the information must not be
of public record and must not be facts that were previously known but are now
presented through a newly discovered source. The “fact” Appellant relies upon
as newly discovered is not the publication of the NAS Report, but the analysis
of the scientific principles supporting hair comparison analysis. His argument
is that the Commonwealth's evidence, specifically the testimony of Mr. Tack-
ett, is unreliable based on the information recited in the NAS Report. It is when
the underlying information was available to Appellant in the public domain
that we must examine.
140 Id. at 9.
141 619 Pa. 549, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013).
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In this case, the Commonwealth is correct that the facts compiled in the NAS
Report were not new, and existed in various sources prior to the publication
of that report. Specifically, the NAS Report refers to various studies and reports
published in the public domain as early as 1974 and as recently as 2007.147
Justice Todd disagreed with this finding in a separate concurring opinion.
He believed the claim was timely. Justice Todd thought that because the NAS
was “unlike other scientific bodies”148 and arguably the nation's “most prestig-
ious scientific organization,”149 the NAS Report was significant. Moreover, NAS
had compiled the report at the request of Congress and “heard testimony from
experts in government, law enforcement, law, academia, and elsewhere; reviewed
published materials, studies, and reports related to forensic science; and con-
ducted independent research.”150 Justice Todd found that, in particular, the NAS
Report’s conclusion that there is “no scientific support for the use of hair com-
parisons for individualization in the absence of nuclear DNA”151 was new. Justice
Todd thought it significant that, in relation to that specific conclusion “the Re-
port cites no [earlier or other] sources.”152 As such, he reasoned, “these are not
merely the regurgitated conclusions from previously published studies, or from a
prior Academy report, which Appellant could have uncovered previously with
some diligence.”153 Justice Todd found that these were,
novel conclusions concerning the deficiencies in the analysis of hair evidence
from the leading science advisory body in the Nation, after being charged under
federal law to make these very assessments, and following its own investigation
and research. No amount of prior diligence by Appellant, no amount of comb-
ing through the Journal of Forensic Sciences, Forensic Science Review, Forensic
Science Communications, or any of the other studies or publications the Acad-
emy reviewed from the last 40 years, could have produced such findings. Such
findings bear the unique imprimatur of the Academy.154
Again, cases like Johnston, Tucker, Enderle, Edmiston demonstrate that,
generally, there is a judicial resistance towards allowing claims that shifting sci-
entific opinion about various forensic identification methods (contained in the
NAS Report) qualify as newly discovered evidence. These rulings reflect the trend
identified in the category one, subsection (a) cases. In so holding, the courts (1)
defer to lower court decisions regarding the qualification of newly discovered
evidence; and (2) do not label the findings of the NAS Report – including the
unprecedented finding that individualization was not proper in any other disci-
pline other than DNA analysis – as newly discovered evidence. As it stands, the
cases in category two show that the shift in scientific opinions contained in the
NAS Report fail to qualify as newly discovered evidence. This is largely because
147 Id. at 570-71.
148 Id. at 583. (Todd, J., concurring).
149 Id. (Todd, J., concurring).
150 Id. (Todd, J., concurring).
151 Id. at 584. (Todd, J., concurring).
152 Id. (Todd, J., concurring).
153 Id. (Todd, J., concurring).
154 Id. (Todd, J., concurring).
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courts take the view that the NAS Report presents no “new” facts given that it
cites to older research and lacks specificity to individual cases, albeit there is at
least one recorded negative judicial reaction to this assessment in Edmiston.
Again, the courts’ demand for probative evidence that bears on the specific facts
at issue in the single case before them is fatal for newly discovered evidence
claims. In other words, the sui generis nature of adversarial legal proceedings has
been used to limit the use of the NAS Report to support newly discovered evi-
dence claims based on shifting scientific opinion and/or controversy in various
forensic identification disciplines.155
***
A crucial question, therefore, is why are appellate courts so reluctant to ac-
cept that even the unprecedented findings of the NAS Report qualify as newly
discovered evidence? Further why are they so keen to defer to both precedent and
lower court findings, but unwilling to defer to the expert findings of the NAS in
relation to forensic science? These questions require an exposition of two theo-
retical frameworks: the theory of finality and legal process theory. The courts’
restriction of post-conviction review by narrowly interpreting the high thresholds
for relief contained in newly discovered evidence rules, is symptomatic of an in-
stitution that favours finality over substantive accuracy. Moreover, the appellate
courts’ routine deference to precedent and lower court findings is indicative of an
institution that supports the notion that procedural regularity legitimizes out-
comes, as opposed to substantive accuracy. As such, this pattern in judicial deci-
sion-making raises important questions about the courts’ institutional compe-
tence to address indeterminacy when shifting scientific opinion raises “new” legal
questions. Institutional competence is, of course, a classic tenet of legal process
theory. Part V, therefore, further explores the influence of the doctrine of finality
and legal process theory in this context.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF FINALITY AND THE
APPELLATE COURTS’ INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE FOR
ASSESSING INDETERMINACY
The foreclosing of post-conviction relief claims, judicial deference to proce-
dural regularity and institutional competence are concepts related to the theory
of finality and legal process theory. This section explores these two theoretical
frameworks, and how they relate to the examples of judicial decision-making
presented in Part IV.
A. FINALITY, POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE RULES
The obvious theoretical reason for why courts reject any post-conviction
challenges is finality. The doctrine of finality developed out of a taxonomy de-
155 This point goes beyond claims associated with forensic identification methods.
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tailed by Professor Paul M. Bator in his landmark 1963 article, Finality in Crim-
inal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.156 Bator’s article “…
laid the intellectual groundwork for the Supreme Court’s post-trial review juris-
prudence and has been cited in hundreds of law review articles and court opin-
ions.”157 Bator argued that the finality of criminal judgments serves important
interests that are harmed by expansions of post-conviction rights,158 and pro-
posed that because we can never be 100% certain that no error of law or fact
was made during trial (or appellate) proceedings, “we must impose an end to
litigation at some point or else the case could conceivably go on ad infinitum.”159
Bator argued that endless litigation led to numerous, negative consequences.
These included undermining public confidence in the criminal justice system, al-
lowing prisoners to escape corrective sanctions, and negative impacts on the ef-
fective enforcement of the law. Finality, Bator argued, was needed to prevent
and/or minimize these consequences.160 Fifty years later, the criminal justice sys-
tem is very familiar with the notion that finality is not a singular “consequence”
but rather “shorthand for a collection of interests scholars assume are furthered
by any restrictions on review.”161 These interests include ensuring respect for
criminal judgments and victims’ rights, conserving state resources, furthering the
efficiency and deterrent and educational functions of the criminal law, satisfying
the human need for closure, incentivizing defense counsel to “get it right first
time” and preventing a flood of non-controversial claims from masking the
fewer, credible ones.162 Proponents of finality consider that providing defendants
with broader post-conviction rights harms these –society desired– interests.163
Consequently, when considering appeals, judges must balance society’s interests
in finality against the constitutional rights of defendants.164 Of course, finality
does serve the interests of defendants too, including their interests not to be sub-
ject to repetitive trials, to be able to move on in their lives, and not to be ‘caught’
by repetitive state attempts at trying a case (and its luck) that wear down the
resources and stamina of the defendant.165 At present, however, the scales are not
commonly tipped in favour of defendants, with finality often being used as a
156 Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
157 Andrew Chongseh Kim, Beyond Finality: How Making Criminal Judgements Less Final Can
Further the “Interests of Finality” 2013 UTAH L. REV. 561, 563 (2013).
158 Bator, supra note 156.
159 Sigmund G. Popko, Putting Finality in Perspective: Collateral Review of Criminal Judgments
in the DNA Era, 1 L.J. SOC. JUST. 75, 76 (2011).
160 Id. at 78.
161 Kim, supra note 157, at 568.
162 See generally Kim, supra note 157; Bator, supra note 156; Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV 142 (1970); Carrie
Sperling, When Finality and Innocence Collide in CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN
AMERICA 139 (Sarah Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).
163 Kim, supra note 157, at 573.
164 Id. at 566.
165 Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of PostConviction Discovery,
Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 545, 552-53 (2014).
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“trump card that presumptively outranks defendants’ interests…”166As Professor
Laurie Levenson states “The criminal justice system is obsessed with finality.
While it professes to focus on obtaining fair and accurate results, the goal of
finality is never far away.” 167
The criminal justice system’s obsession with finality is visible in the vast ma-
jority of post-conviction relief frameworks because these procedures “…grow out
of a strong tradition that values the finality of criminal convictions.”168 These
procedures, Professor Carrie Sperling states, form a “shockingly confusing
web…” for petitioners. 169 Newly discovered evidence rules form part of this web.
This is because – as explained in Part II – newly discovered evidence proceedings
typically employ high thresholds for relief, such as requiring petitioners to prove
that: the new fact was undiscoverable before trial; is beyond mere impeachment
and cumulative evidence; has been raised with reasonable diligence; and has ver-
dict-changing capacity. 170 Such thresholds are a hallmark of finality. It is widely
accepted that high thresholds for relief work to alleviate judicial concerns about
finality.171 As one commentator notes, “Naturally, a state has an interest in main-
taining the finality of its judgments. Thus, respect for the finality of judgments is
a concern in any habeas analysis. A legal standard that provides a realistic op-
portunity for state prisoners to obtain habeas relief is arguably harmful to the
state's interest in finality because it increases the likelihood that some judgments
will be overturned.”172
Newly discovered evidence rules reflect the criminal justice system’s general
allegiance to finality. For instance, they can even work to foreclose relief by way
of DNA testing, which is a common component of newly discovered evidence
claims. The onerous standards involved in post-conviction statutes, like newly
discovered evidence rules, allow courts to deny access to DNA testing that could
providing compelling evidence of innocence. Those statutes, Professor Brandon
Garrett argues, “appear to provide mere window-dressing for post-conviction
166 Kim, supra note 157, at 563. (referencing Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking about Habeas
Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 748, 772–75 (1987); Popko, supra note 159, at 75).
167 Levenson, supra note 165, at 551.
168 Sperling, supra note 162.
169 Sperling, supra note 162; Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 253
(1988) (“[T]he rules governing access to habeas review have become hopelessly confusing and
confused.”); Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Federal Habeas
Corpus and the Piecemeal Problem in Actual Innocence Cases, 10 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV.
LIBERTIES 101 (2013) (discussing the confusing procedures an innocent inmate faces when
asserting a post-conviction challenge and suggesting reforms).
170 Findley, supra note 4, at 1161.
171 Kathleen Callahan, In Limbo: In Re Davis and the Future of Herrera Innocence Claims in
Federal Habeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 655 (2011) (“Furthermore, steps can be taken
to minimize the detrimental impact on comity and federalism. For example, requiring a high
requisite evidentiary showing and a standard of review deferential to state court findings would
help to ensure that federal habeas review of Herrera claims does not trample states' rights. These
procedural standards would also help to alleviate concerns regarding finality, judicial efficiency,
and frivolous claims.”).
172 Theresa Hsu Schriever, In Our Own Backyard: Why California Should Care About Habeas
Corpus, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 763, 790 (2014).
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systems determined to deny access to proof of innocence and to deny relief to
meritorious claims of innocence.”173 Notably, concerns about finality have led to
the United States Supreme Court denying relief in this context. In the case of
District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne,174 the U.S.
Supreme Court determined that due process does not entitle a prisoner to access
evidence in order to run additional tests (in this case more sophisticated DNA
testing) that were not available at the time of trial. Finality concerns underpinned
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Osborne. As Professor Kim explains, in
Osborne, the Court denied relief “based in part on fears that allowing the test
would do unspecified damage to the “traditional [interest in] finality.”175 In his
dissent, Justice Stevens conceded that allowing the test would harm finality, but
such interests must take a back-seat in light of the power of DNA evidence to
prove innocence.176 However, although it was generally agreed amongst the Jus-
tices that granting relief would harm the interests of finality, no attempt was
made to explain how those interests would be harmed by allowing the defendant
to pay to test the DNA evidence in his case. 177
Professor Daniel Medwed confirms newly discovered evidence rules are pro-
tective of finality interests in non-DNA cases too, such as where a petitioner
claims that there has been a shift in scientific opinion and/or the development of
scientific controversy in relation to the forensic evidence used against him. Med-
wed argues that the inherent difficulty in litigating claims predicated on newly
discovered non-DNA evidence is “exacerbated by the structural design of most
state post-conviction regimes: in effect, the path to proving one's innocence
through new evidence has become virtually impassable due to procedural road-
blocks.”178 In addition, state courts have traditionally viewed newly discovered
evidence claims with “disdain, fearing the impact of such claims on the finality
of judgments…”179
Finality has come to have a significant influence on legal discourse, with
judges (and scholars) routinely asserting that restricting defendants’ post-convic-
tion arsenal benefits society. Scholars have criticized the courts for not expanding
on how finality benefits society, with some even arguing that such restrictions
can even “harm the very interests increased finality is presumed to protect.”180
173 Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1684 (2008).
174 557 U.S. 52 (2009).
175 Kim, supra note 157 at 574.
176 Osborne, 557 U.S. at 99 (Stevens, J dissenting).
177 Kim, supra note 157 at 574.
178 Medwed, supra note 3, at 658.
179 Id. at 664.
180 Kim, supra note 157, at 620, 621. (“This Article argues, however, that restrictions on
defendants’ rights in posttrial review can often harm the very interests increased finality is
presumed to protect. Limiting defendants’ rights to obtain relief from improper convictions or
excessively lengthy sentences also limits the state’s ability to identify and remedy wrongful
incarceration. Although restrictions on posttrial review invariably help conserve judicial and
prosecutorial time, they often impose net costs on the state as a whole. Arguments that restrictions
on relief from errors after trial encourage defense counsel to take greater care in representation
are theoretically appealing, but falsely assume that trial attorneys have the capability to provide
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Judges are supposed to weigh these interests singularly and not view finality as a
“monolithic interest of presumptive importance.”181 Often this is not the case,
however, with many courts supporting their judgments with a simple reference
to a general societal interest in finality, and some courts making no mention of
the concept at all.
This latter judicial practice is evident in cases presented in Part IV. The
courts routinely reject newly discovered evidence claims that argue the findings
of the 2009 NAS Report (and other critical sources), with regard to the fallibility
of various forensic identification methods, represent a shift in scientific opinion
or the existence of scientific controversy. The courts do not mention finality, but
interpret the high thresholds comprised in newly discovered evidence rules nar-
rowly to reject these claims. For instance, courts reason that such criticism was
discoverable prior to the publication of the report, and that the NAS Report has
no bearing on the case at hand and therefore does not have verdict changing
capacity. As such, the judiciary apply the law in a way that silently favours final-
ity interests over substantive accuracy.
Applying the law is a fundamental, institutional function of the courts. The
cases in Part IV show the courts to be carrying out this function (in the context
of this article) in an arguably consistent manner, which is “rationally adapted to
the task.”182 Accordingly, it would be Bator’s view that “in the absence of insti-
tutional or functional reasons to the contrary we should accept a presumption
against mere repetition of the process on the alleged ground that, after all, error
could have occurred.”183 This view embodies the principle of institutional settle-
ment, a classic tenet of legal process theory. How this principle relates to the
pattern presented in Part IV is explored next.
a higher quality of representation with the same limited resources. The traditional arguments that
limiting defendants’ rights to appeal increases the deterrent value of criminal law are
unpersuasive in light of modern research on rehabilitation and the miniscule effect posttrial
review has on the punishment criminals can expect to receive. On the other hand, providing
defendants with fair opportunities to seek relief from claimed errors can increase the subjective
legitimacy of the system, thereby encouraging defendants to obey the law in the future.
Conversely, restricting posttrial relief in ways that defendants see as arbitrary or unfair may well
increase recidivism. Courts and scholars treat finality as either a thumb on the scale or a hefty
interest that weighs in the favor of restrictions on posttrial review. A close analysis reveals,
however, that it is often neither. Rather, restrictions on posttrial review that make criminal
judgments more “final” often harm the very interests finality presumes to protect. Moving beyond
the language of finality and towards a more critical analysis of the costs and benefits of posttrial
review may allow society to craft more efficient and equitable systems of criminal justice.”).
181 Id. at 578.
182 Bator, supra note 156, at 454.
183 Id.
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B. LEGAL PROCESS THEORY: THE PRINCIPLE OF INSTITUTIONAL
SETTLEMENT AND THE COMPETENCE OF APPELLATE COURTS TO
ADDRESS INDETERMINACY WHEN SHIFTING SCIENTIFIC OPINION
RAISES NEW LEGAL QUESTIONS
This sub-section first explains how the principle of institutional settlement
relates to the pattern of judicial decision-making presented in Part IV. It then
critically explores the institutional competence of the appellate courts to address
indeterminacy when shifting scientific opinion raises new legal questions.
i. The Principle of Institutional Settlement
Hart and Saks – the fathers of Legal Process Theory – conceived the principle
of institutional settlement.184 The principle of institutional settlement expresses
the view that when competent institutions produce decisions that have been ar-
rived at as a result of “duly established procedures”, those decisions “ought to
be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they [the proce-
dures] are duly changed.”185 In other words, the principle theorizes that it is pro-
cedural regularity in the decision-making process of a competent institution that
legitimizes the institution’s decisions, not whether its decisions are substantively
accurate. Procedure is “critically important”186 because it, inter alia, provides im-
portant practical benefits. Procedure provides an effective way of obtaining
“good” decisions, facilitating the collaboration of institutions in an intercon-
nected institutional system (like the criminal justice system), and enhances the
legitimacy of the law by generating consistency.187 In the context of this article,
the legal process vision suggests that the judicial decision-making pattern identi-
fied in Part IV is good, institutionally appropriate, and legitimate.
However, the competence of appellate courts to address indeterminacy
when shifting scientific opinion raises new legal questions is open to critical anal-
ysis. The following sub-section critically considers the preparedness of the appel-
late courts to rationally and accurately assess scientific uncertainty, like that pre-
sented by newly discovered evidence claims grounded on the alleged indetermi-
nacy present across various forensic identification disciplines. It is presently un-
deniable that (despite the use of rational procedures and decision-making) the
criminal justice system makes factual errors. As Professor David Wolitz points
out, the power of new evidence like DNA to cast legitimate doubt on a trial ver-
dict quite apart from procedural defect is something “Professor Bator failed to
acknowledge or foresee in his argument.”188 While procedural regularity may
provide levels of consistency and certainty, it “also raises the possibility that the
184 Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 4th ed. 1994).
185 Id.
186 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a
Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 721 (1991).
187 Id.
188 David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1027, 1060 (2010).
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importance people attach to procedural justice may distract them from the failure
of the legal system to provide substantively accurate outcomes.”189 In the Era of
Innocence judges must have a closer eye on substance; concerns about accuracy
must take on a more prominent role in their decision-making.
ii. The Competence of Appellate Courts to Address Indeterminacy When
Shifting Scientific Opinion Raises New Legal Questions
The NAS Report presents the criminal justice system – and in particular ap-
pellate judges – with scientific uncertainty. As D. Michael Risinger explains,
Much of the NAS/NRC Report concentrates on what might be described as the
problem children of forensic science. These are, in general, forensic techniques
that were developed more or less at the dawn of forensic science, such as fin-
gerprint identification, handwriting identification, firearms and toolmark iden-
tification, etc. They mostly deal with “source attributions,” that is, determining
the source item that left a trace in some relevant place, such as a crime scene.
The principles relied upon by such techniques are not the products of science,
as that term is currently understood, but rather the product of a kind of com-
monsense generalization derived from experience with the subject matter under
examination. Neither the generalizations so derived nor the accuracy of the
results arrived at by practitioners of these disciplines have ever been subject to
the kind of systematic testing that has come to be expected as a part of anything
calling itself “science.” This does not mean that the results arrived at are nec-
essarily always in error, but simply that we have no very good evidence about
when they are likely to be in error and when they are likely to be accurate.190
This catalogue, coupled with the NAS Report’s unprecedented conclusions
about the consistency and certainty of DNA analysis, the fact it was commis-
sioned by Congress and authored by a distinguished committee that was not a
“hotbed of card-carrying forensic science skeptics,”191 cast a new, quasi-offi-
cial,192 critical light on a plethora of forensic identification disciplines. As Risinger
puts it, “As a well-documented catalogue of the problems of forensic science by
a highly credentialed body, this report is hugely important.”193
The NAS Report made it “untenable to treat criticisms [of forensic science]
as simply the cavils of uninformed academics with nothing better to do.”194 For
instance, the report posed many new legal questions about admissibility: Does
forensic identification evidence post the findings of the NAS Report satisfy Daub-
ert? Should forensic examiners curtail their testimony? If so, what should that
testimony be? In the context of newly discovered evidence rules, the NAS Report
has driven questions such as: are the findings of the NAS Report new? And, if so,
189 Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013,
1027 (2008).
190 D. Michael Risinger, The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught
with Pitfalls, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 225, 230-231 (2010).
191 Id. at 229.
192 Cole & Edmond, supra note 15 at 588.
193 Risinger, supra note 190, at 226.
194 Id.
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do those findings have verdict changing capacity? These questions are problem-
atic for appellate courts because they stem from, and encompass, scientific un-
certainty. As Professor Emily Hammond Meazell explains, “unresolved (and per-
haps unresolvable) scientific uncertainty places scientific and legal-system values
in greatest tension.”195 This is because science and law embody different cultures:
““[s]cience progresses while law builds slowly on precedent. Science assumes that
humankind is determined by some combination of nature and nurture, while law
assumes that humankind can transcend these influences and exercise free will.
Science is a cooperative endeavor, while most legal institutions operate on an
adversary model.”196
These tensions have led appellate courts largely to avoid a detailed exami-
nation of the questions raised in the context of newly discovered evidence claims
when a petitioner argues, with regards to forensic identification evidence, that
there has been a shift in scientific opinion post the NAS Report. This is demon-
strated by the vast majority of judicial decision-making presented in Part IV. In
rejecting claims, the courts have sided with ideals such as procedural fairness,
finality and predictability (i.e., precedent) over substantive accuracy. This is un-
surprising, as the “The law is rarely concerned solely with factual truth in the
scientific sense because that is rarely society's sole concern.”197 In addition, ap-
pellate courts suffer from a number of institutional deficiencies when it comes to
accurately assessing newly discovered claims based upon uncertainty created by
shifting scientific opinion. These include the appellate courts’ discomfort with
fact-based assessments and non-binary questions, the shortcomings of the adver-
sarial system, and judges’ lack of scientific expertise. Each of these issues are
considered below, along with suggestions for what institutional strengths appel-
late courts have when it comes to making assessments concerning scientific un-
certainty.
a. Problems with Factual Assessments
Appellate courts are used to (and therefore generally good at) assessing legal
error, as opposed to factual error. Most post-conviction relief procedures are law
based; aimed at remedying egregious legal errors related to jurisdiction or consti-
tutionality.198 By contrast, newly discovered evidence procedures are primarily
“fact based”199 and require a factual assessment of the qualification, timing, qual-
ity, relevance and impact of new facts. Consequently, they require courts to step
outside of their comfort zone, particularly in the context of assessments relating
to scientific uncertainty. This is because there is “a natural judicial tendency to
avoid any deep confrontations with science.”200
195 Emily Hammond Meazell, Scientific Avoidance: Toward More Principled Judicial Review of
Legislative Science, 84 IND. L.J. 239, 244 (2009).
196 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 26, 56
(1999).
197 Meazell, supra note 195, at 250.
198 Medwed, supra note 3, at 664.
199 Id.
200 Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as
Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011).
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The fact-based assessments associated with newly discovered evidence can
be onerous and ill-suited for comity and efficiency based institutional agendas,
and, indeed, the expertise of judges. The onerous nature of the assessment stems,
in part, from the fact newly discovered evidence rules comprise multiple elements.
Generally newly discovered evidence rules “involve some combination of
showings that the new evidence could not have been discovered prior to trial with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; that the evidence is relevant and not cumu-
lative or merely impeaching; and that the new evidence creates a sufficient prob-
ability of a different result at a new trial.”201 Using this definition as a benchmark,
it can be said newly discovered evidence rules typically require at least five factual
assessments: Is the evidence a new fact? Was the new fact discoverable before
trial? Did the petitioner exercise reasonable diligence in discovering and present-
ing the new fact? Is the new fact relevant and probative? And, does the new fact
have verdict changing capacity? Each element comprises a challenging fact-based
assessment that will often (especially in non-DNA cases) be (1) different in each
case; (2) without a clear answer; and (3) outside the expertise of the judge. For
instance, diligence must be measured along a continuum. Diligence might be sat-
isfied if a new witness is found within ten weeks of becoming known to the peti-
tioner, but diligence in discovering (or, indeed, waiting for) the crystallization of
a new scientific theory might reasonably take ten years or an infinite amount of
time. Moreover, when can a scientific theory be said to have crystallized, if ever?
And, how is it determined if the new scientific theory would have been under-
stood by and therefore persuaded a jury to deliver a different verdict? The non-
binary nature of these questions presents further problems for the courts, as ex-
plored in the next section. Moreover, there is evidence of inconsistent interpreta-
tions of these elements, which limits the courts’ ability to correct error. 202
Concepts associated with newly discovered evidence rules also have prob-
lematic definitions. For instance, the concept of “innocence,” which petitioners
commonly attempt to prove through newly discovered evidence procedures, “has
no real legal meaning in most jurisdictions.”203 As Findley describes “In a legal
system that presumes innocence unless and until guilt is established beyond a
reasonable doubt, and generally permits or requires no corresponding finding or
judgment of “innocent,” it can be a vexing problem to determine when a person
previously found “guilty” is entitled to relief from an unsound conviction as op-
posed to when a person may justifiably claim to be “innocent” and to have been
“exonerated.””204 Even in DNA cases, there is “no such thing as absolute proof
of guilt.”205 This problem is compounded in non-DNA cases, like those where
petitioners are attempting to show a shift in scientific opinion in relation to the
forensic identification evidence used against them. This is because there is an “in-
herent difficulty and ambiguity in trying to prove a negative.”206 For instance,
201 Findley, supra note 4, at 1161.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 1160.
204 Id. at 1161.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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Alex is convicted of a homicide offence largely on the basis that a firearms exam-
iner testified that his gun shot the fatal bullets “to the exclusion of all other guns
in the world.” Alex is subsequently able to use the findings of the NAS Report
regarding tool-mark evidence to significantly undermine the prosecution’s case
and obtain relief via a newly discovered evidence procedure. In that instance, can
Alex claim to be innocent? As Findley puts it in relation to a similar hypothetical,
“…while the new evidence may provide new grounds for challenging the prose-
cution's proof of guilt, it does not necessarily conclusively prove the opposite:
that the defendant did not commit the crime charged.”207
Collectively, these issues make the assessment of newly discovered evidence
claims, based upon uncertainty created by shifting scientific opinion, difficult for
the appellate courts to accurately resolve. This is exacerbated by the non-binary
nature of the questions presented by newly discovered evidence claims.
b. The Non-Binary Nature of Questions Stemming from Newly
Discovered Evidence Rules and Scientific Uncertainty
The NAS Report presents appellate courts with scientific uncertainty.
Amongst other things, the report identified vacuums in scientific knowledge with
regards to various forensic disciplines. For instance it found there was a lack of
research about the variability, reliability, and repeatability of tool-marks; that
there was a dearth of scientific underpinning for individualization based on hair
comparisons; and there was a need to conduct research into validity, reliability,
variables, and population studies in the field of shoe print analysis. These vacu-
ums pose (currently) unresolvable questions, such as: can a firearms examiner
ever scientifically conclude there is a “match” between a suspect weapon and
suspect bullets? Will any (soft science) forensic method ever be as reliable as DNA
evidence? These gaps are either due to a lack of appropriate research, evolving
research and/or under-developed research. Some forensic science communities
have made significant strides post-NAS,208 but many questions remain unan-
swered. Moreover, due to the evolutive nature of scientific enquiry, any answers
will likely be a moving target. After all, scientific truth is something of a fiction:
“Although [science's] goal is to approach true explanations as closely as possible,
its investigators claim no final or permanent explanatory truths. Science changes.
It evolves…””209
207 Id. at 1162.
208 See, e.g., United States v. Love, No. 10-cr-2418 (MMM), 2011 WL 2173644 (S.D. Cal. June
1, 2011). In this case a United States District Court in California recognized that there was evi-
dence that the forensic science community has generally started to take appropriate steps to re-
spond to criticism aimed at its methodologies. See also Sarah Lucy Cooper, Challenges to
Fingerprint Identification Evidence: Why the Courts Need a New Approach to Finality
(forthcoming in WM. MITCHELL L. REV.) (copy on file with author).
209 See generally ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD (1925); see also
Panel on Scientific Responsibility and the Conduct of Research: Committee on Science,
Engineering, and Public Policy, 1 RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE: ENSURING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
RESEARCH PROCESS 38 (1992) (“Although its goal is to approach true explanations as closely as
possible, science's investigators claim no final or permanent explanatory truths. Science changes.
It evolves.”).
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Meazell labels the questions in the paragraph above as “qualitative or non-
binary”210, and suggests courts are institutionally weak to handle the scientific
uncertainty to which these questions relate. This is because “When a court is
asked to resolve a question science itself has not resolved, it is simply unequipped
to do so because legal values--and more particularly, the judicial process--do not
employ the scientific method.”211 Conversely, courts have “significant institu-
tional strength”212 in answering binary questions. Binary questions, Meazell ex-
plains, are when “the scientific issue relates to “certain,” or positive science--such
as a judicially noticeable scientific fact--no additional scientific methodology
needs to be employed. Instead, usual legal-system values easily discern a binary
answer in a way indistinct from courts' other fact-finding methods.”213 Examples
of such binary questions, in the context of forensic science would be: has there
been criticism of the ability of tool-mark, fingerprint and hair examiners to en-
gage in individualization? Has the NAS recommended reforms in the area of fo-
rensic science? As Meazell explains, “Courts are very good at reaching binary
decisions relatively quickly.”214
Newly discovered evidence rules demand that appellate courts answer ques-
tions such as: Is the evidence a new fact? Was the new fact discoverable before
trial? Did the petitioner exercise reasonable diligence in discovering and present-
ing the new fact? Is the new fact relevant and probative? And, does the new fact
have verdict changing capacity? In some cases these questions might be binary in
nature. For example, it would be simple for a court to qualify DNA evidence
(related to a 1974 case) extracted by modern testing methods only available from
2014, as “new” without the need for further exploration. However, more often,
the questions posed to courts are non-binary in nature, especially in non-DNA
cases involving a shift in scientific opinion. Consider the following example:
Jack is charged with murder in 1990. At his trial in 1991, the prosecution
allege Jack set fire to a liquor store, killing three people inside. A state fire analyst
testifies that the crime scene presented numerous “hallmarks of arson”, including
brown stains on the floors, “V” shaped soot marks and spider-webbed glass. The
state also presents evidence that, when stopped for jay walking near to the liquor
store, Jack was found in possession of an accelerant. In 2015, the State Justice
Project (on behalf of Jack) files a newly discovered evidence claim based on the
“new” fact that the hallmarks of arson have been discredited i.e., there has been
a shift in scientific opinion that undermines the conviction. In fact, the project
alleges the new evidence – in the form of an expert affidavit -- proves there was
no arson at all, and the fire was an accident. The project’s interest in Jack’s case
was triggered in 2009 by the NAS Report, which found that conclusions by fire
investigators that a particular fire was arson, on the basis of rules of thumb, are
not well founded.215 Judge Wilson assesses Jack’s claim in appellate court.
210 See generally Meazell, supra note 195.
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In assessing the claim, Judge Wilson must determine whether the criticism
of arson hallmarks is new; whether that criticism was discoverable before trial;
whether Jack has exercised reasonable diligence in presenting it to court; whether
the criticism is relevant and probative; and whether the criticism has verdict
changing capacity? These questions are non-binary in nature and, therefore, dif-
ficult for the judge to address. This is partly because some of the questions relate
to scientific uncertainty. For instance, whether the criticism of arson indicators
qualifies as new and was not discoverable before trial requires an exploration of
when the hallmarks were first criticized, and whether scientific uncertainty re-
mains in the field. The answer to the first question may be found in 1990 when
the Lime Street Fire Experiment was conducted,216 although the NAS Report lent
support to the argument in 2009.217 Given Jack was tried in 1991, evidence of
this experiment was arguably discoverable before trial, but given the trial was so
soon after the experiment it is questionable whether the findings of the experi-
ment were available to Jack’s lawyer and of sufficient weight to challenge the
prosecution’s case at that time. Moreover, the NAS Report cites to research re-
lated to the experiment, reducing its weight as “new” in the eyes of the court, as
per the rationales employed in cases like Foster and Johnson infra. In addition,
given hallmarks of arson continue to be used as indicators of arson,218 scientific
uncertainty remains in the discipline. In the end, to make an accurate assessment
of whether Jack has brought a “new” fact to the court that was not discoverable
before his trial, the judge must engage in the near impossible task of resolving the
remaining scientific uncertainty himself.
The judge’s task would be much easier if he tasked with accurately deter-
mining binary questions, such as: Has there been criticism of the hallmarks of
arson? Or is evidence that non-arson fires present evidence such as spider-web
glass and brown stains? Faced with these binary questions, the judge could no
doubt make an accurate determination without great difficulty.
As it stands, however, Judge Wilson’s task is fraught with difficulty, right
from the first factual assessment he faces. The main problem is that there is sci-
entific uncertainty in relation to the veracity of arson indicators and the assess-
ment of arson fires, and the judge must attempt to resolve that uncertainty when
determining the newly discovered evidence claim. This is a near impossible chal-
lenge for the judge, not in the sense that he can’t make the relevant decision fairly
and rationally – but in the sense that he will struggle to make it accurately. Ar-
guably, given the fidelity that post-conviction procedures and judicial decision-
making in this domain confer on the legal process vision, the judge’s inability to
make accurate assessments is somewhat irrelevant. However, in the Era of Inno-
cence, hiding behind process – particularly as a default position – is concerning.
The judge’s struggle is not only attributable to the framing of the questions
he is required to answer, but other institutional weaknesses too. For instance, it
is also likely that Judge Wilson would lack scientific expertise, and be presented
with a trial record that presents a “battle of the experts.” These two issues relate
216 John J. Lentini, The Lime Street Fire: Another Perspective, 43 FIRE & ARSON INVESTIGATOR
52, 52 (1992).
217 NAS REPORT, supra note 10, at 172- 73.
218 Id.
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to the dearth of scientific expertise amongst legal professionals, including judges,
and the limitations of the adversarial model respectively. These issues are consid-
ered next.
c. The Shortcomings of the Adversarial System and a Lack of Sci-
entific Expertise amongst Judges
The adversarial model generally prevents a full consideration of scientific
issues, because it encourages parties to “produce evidence favorable to their re-
spective sides, regardless of the quality of that science.”219 This leads to a “battle
of the experts.”220 Judges (and jurors at trial level) are not presented with the
full picture. Instead, they “hear highly practiced alternative stories that
only roughly approximate what might be termed reality.”221 In terms of
expert testimony, because of the adversarial model, “information that
reaches the legal system…does not represent the scientific field more gen-
erally.”222 Very often, courts are presented with experts at the “margins
of their disciplines”223 who are “chosen…because they are willing to be
more certain in their conclusions.”224 Consequently, “the adversarial process
will not necessarily produce a full spectrum of scientific research on a particular
topic, making it very different from the formal and informal consensus-building
methods that science itself uses.”225 The nature of the adversarial process there-
fore makes it difficult for judges to resolve scientific uncertainty accurately,
which, as explored above, judges already have difficulty doing because of the
non-binary nature of the questions asked of them and the vacuums in, and evolv-
ing nature of, relevant scientific knowledge.
On top of this, judges generally lack scientific expertise and technical train-
ing. 226 Some scholars argue that judges “do not think like scientists”227 and there-
fore do not have the capacity to make accurate assessments about science. As
Professor Michael J. Saks notes, “Just as legal training teaches one the intellectual
skills to analyze legal problems, scientific training teaches one how to analyze
empirical questions and proposed answers. This places judges in a weak position
to know what questions need to be asked in order to test an empirical claim or
how to evaluate the data offered in answer.”228 Professor Frederic I. Lederer fur-
ther notes that lawyers’ educational deficiency (when it comes to scientific
knowledge) “… often places lawyers at a disadvantage when confronted with
scientific evidence…lawyers often fail to ask the right questions and uncritically
219 Meazell, supra note 195, at 255.
220 Id.
221 Faigman, supra note 196, at 65.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 54.
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accept scientific assertions.”229 The NAS Report recognized this was a significant
issue too, stating, eleven times, that “lawyers and judges often have insufficient
training and background in scientific methodology, and they often fail to fully
comprehend the approaches employed by different forensic science disciplines
and the reliability of forensic science evidence...”230 This deficiency is often at-
tributed to a science and math “black hole” in legal education – “a black hole
that becomes harder to close the more removed it is from law school.”231 Conse-
quently, as Professor Jessica D. Gabel states, “As lawyers, we are ill-equipped to
speak the language of science.”232
Collectively, these institutional weaknesses engender an appellate court sys-
tem that has great difficulty in accurately assessing newly discovered evidence
claims based on indeterminacy. This is because these claims require judges to
conduct a fact-based assessment to resolve scientific uncertainty, which is pre-
sented to them largely in the form of non-binary questions, and conducted within
an adversarial model that limits the quality of evidence before them, and which
they do not commonly have the expertise to accurately assess. These issues, Mea-
zell argues, “speak to the courts' limited ability to deal with scientific uncer-
tainty.”233
d. Institutional Strengths
Despite the deficiencies detailed above, the appellate courts do have some
institutional strengths when it comes to accurately engaging in assessments con-
cerning indeterminacy. First, appellate courts have the competence to address
these science-related factual questions,234 as it is their constitutional role to review
the law. Moreover, addressing indeterminacy is “mostly an issue for appellate
courts.”235 Addressing uncertainty is a crucial part of the appellate judiciary’s day
job. Appellate courts, therefore, have the institutional power to develop and en-
gage in appropriate decision-making procedures to suit the task at hand. In other
words, they have the strength to evolve towards decision-making that is more
sensitive to notions of accuracy. As per the legal process vision, a “distinctive
comparative advantage of the judiciary”236 is its ability to use “the defining tools
of legal craft--to render decisions according to principle rather than discretion or
subjective policy judgment.”237 The judiciary can, as part of their craft, strive for
decision-making that accords with principles of accuracy. Moreover, they courts
can do this and be loyal to notions of procedural regularity. An important facet
229 Frederic I. Lederer, Scientific Evidence--An Introduction, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 519-
20 (1984).
230 See Jessica D. Gabel, Forensiphilia: Is Public Fascination with Forensic Science a Love Affair
or a Fatal Attraction?, 36 NEW ENG. J ON. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 233, 258 (2010).
231 Id. at 257-58.
232 Id. at 258.
233 Meazell, supra note 195, at 252.
234 Id. at 283.
235 Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 940
(2003).
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of process thinking is the ability of an institution to provide "mechanisms for
systemic self-correction, an important virtue under the relativist theory of democ-
racy.”238 In other words, institutional procedure has an inbuilt corrective func-
tion. To bolster this strength, the courts can utilize a variety of pre-existing insti-
tutional mechanisms. For example, judges can use procedures to narrow the dis-
puted scientific issues; conduct hearings where the court can examine potential
experts; and appoint independent experts, special masters, and specially trained
law clerks.239 Courts also have a convening power, namely the ability to bring
together the various actors needed to craft effective solutions to multi-dimen-
sional problems,240 like, for example, scientific uncertainty.
Second, with the emergence of the Innocence Movement in particular, ap-
pellate courts have also been thrust into conducting more newly discovered evi-
dence based fact assessments. As Findley recalls, “The innocence movement got
its initial momentum from using new evidence--primarily DNA evidence--to
prove factual, as opposed to “legal,” innocence.”241 With the ever-increasing
rhetoric of innocence across the criminal justice system,242 and the role scientific
evidence plays in that movement, judges should become more familiar with sci-
ence orientated fact assessments. This increased familiarity should serve to im-
prove their fact based assessments and engagement with non-binary questions in
the domain of newly discovered evidence. As aforementioned, courts also have
great institutional strength in making binary decisions, of which some newly dis-
covered evidence claims will encompass. The courts should apply this skill in
favour of accuracy-focused assessments when it is appropriate to do so.
Third, judges can engage in further scientific and technical training. After
all, given judges are prime consumers of scientific evidence, they should “learn
to evaluate what they are getting for their dollar.”243 Moreover, judges are intel-
ligent people with the capacity to engage accurately with technical issues. The
courts’ institutional strength is also furthered by the judiciary’s (at least per-
ceived) neutral position and prestige.244 The courts’ lack of a direct stake in the
outcome of a case and the respect they command, should enable them to engage
in objective, accurate and thorough fact-finding, unburdened by “subjective pol-
icy judgment.”245
In light of these institutional strengths, there is reason to be optimistic about
the courts’ ability to engage accurately in the indeterminacy raised in newly dis-
covered evidence claims based on shifting scientific opinion. Moreover, they can
do this and remain true to key tenets of the legal process vision.
238 Eskridge & Peller, supra note 186, at 721.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Newly discovered evidence rules are an important feature of a defendant’s
post-conviction arsenal. In particular, the ability of these rules to effectively han-
dle claims based on shifting scientific opinion in relation to forensic identification
evidence is crucial. This is because, in recent years, the ability of various, popular
forensic disciplines to engage in source attribution (especially individualization)
– a function the criminal justice system has (almost) unreservedly relied on these
disciplines to undertake for decades – has been significantly criticized. The 2009
NAS Report was a landmark event in this context, rubber stamping such criticism
with the imprimatur of the National Academies.
Since 2009, petitioners have argued that the criticism levelled at these foren-
sic identification methods is newly discovered evidence; contending that the crit-
icism represents a shift in the scientific opinion that was used to convict them.
The appellate courts, however, routinely reject these claims. In doing so, the
courts (1) defer to lower court decisions regarding the qualification of newly dis-
covered evidence; and (2) do not label the findings of the NAS Report – including
the unprecedented finding that individualization was not proper in any other dis-
cipline other than DNA analysis – as newly discovered evidence. Appellate courts
tend to take the view that the NAS Report presents no “new” facts given that it
cites to older research, and lacks verdict changing capacity because its findings
are not specific to individual cases.
This pattern in judicial decision-making shows the courts to be favoring fi-
nality interests and procedural regularity over substantive accuracy. The obvious
theoretical reason for why courts foreclose post-conviction review is finality, as
concerns about comity, resource and preventing a flood of trivial claims are cru-
cial facets of the appellate courts’ institutional agendas. The relevant case law
also presents the courts as an institution that is loyal to notions of procedure and
predictability, and therefore faithful to the legal process vision. At the heart of
that vision is the principle of institutional settlement, which theorizes that it is
procedural regularity in the decision-making process of a competent institution
that legitimizes the institution’s decisions, not whether its decisions are substan-
tively accurate.
The side-lining of substantive accuracy is problematic for newly discovered
evidence claims because they are fact-based remedies. Furthermore, when it
comes to scientific uncertainty, such as that present within many forensic identi-
fication disciplines at present, the appellate courts are institutionally weak to
make accurate determinations. This is because appellate courts tend to avoid con-
frontations with science, are generally uncomfortable (and inexperienced) with
fact-based assessments and non-binary questions (like those presented by newly
discovered evidence rules), and must confront the challenges presented by the
adversarial model and their own lack of scientific expertise. These deficiencies
combine to make it very difficult for appellate courts to address scientific uncer-
tainty accurately.
However, there is reason to be optimistic. The appellate courts do have com-
petence to address factual questions and indeterminacy. In fact, it a crucial func-
tion of their docket. As such, they have the institutional strength to evolve to-
wards decision-making that is more sensitive to notions of accuracy. In addition,
Judicial Responses to Shifting Scientificv Opinion
689
appellate courts are engaging with fact-assessments related to scientific evidence
more frequently, can address binary questions with skill and speed, and have the
neutrality and professional ‘clout’ to engage in accurate fact-finding. Judges also
can avail themselves of further technical training and assistance. These institu-
tional strengths should be harnessed.
In light of the fact that nearly 50% of DNA exonerations to date are at-
tributable, in some way, to unreliable and/or improper forensic evidence, the ap-
pellate courts must have a closer eye on eye on accuracy with regards to relevant
forensic disciplines. The problem of wrongful conviction on the basis of errone-
ous science is unlikely to go away soon. The courts must begin to remedy their
institutional weaknesses, and seek to harness and apply their institutional
strengths in favour of accurate assessments when faced with newly discovered
evidence claims concerning scientific uncertainty.
Judges should take a more proactive role in remedying factual error caused
by erroneous science. Science will always “encompass some quantum of uncer-
tainty, there will always be a policy gap for our legal institutions to fill.”246 Courts
cannot – and should not – be expected to conclusively resolve scientific uncer-
tainty; however they should no longer – as a default position – hide behind pro-
cedural regularity to the detriment of substantive accuracy. Courts should not fill
policy gaps with generalized finality interests, and neglect their own institutional
competence for providing the most accurate possible assessment of newly discov-
ered evidence claims raising questions related to scientific uncertainty.
246 Meazell, supra note 195, at 250.
